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IN THE UTAH COURT QF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
VS.
CASE NO. 890643-CA
PRIORITY NO. 2

GEORGE OLIVER DUMAS,
AppelIant/Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A.,
section 7S-2a-3(2)(j).
NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Defendant's four convictions, pursuant to
a bench trial before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson sitting in
Summit County, Utah, stemming from a four count information

(Count I:

Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft by
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by Receiving,
U.C.A., section 76-6-408, and; Count IV: Habitual Criminal, U.C.A.,
section 76-8-1001).
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Court err

by convicting the Defendant under two

separate counts of Theft by Receiving

(Count I: as to the 1972 GMC

and Count II: as to the snowmobile) when both items were stolen in a
single criminal episode from the same individual.
2.

Did the Court err

by convicting the Defendant of Theft by

Receiving, pursuant to Counts I, II, and III, where each of these

Counts in the information fails to delineate whether the Defendant
was being charged with Theft by Receiving or Theft by Concealing.
3.

Did the Court err

by convicting Defendant under Count I:

Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft by
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by Receiving,
U.C.A., section 76-6-408 based upon insufficient evidence.
4.

Did the Court err

by convicting the Defendant under Count IV

(Habitual Criminal) when one of the previous underlying felonies was
committed prior to the enactment of the Habitual Criminal Statute
(U.C.A. 76-8-1001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged in a four count information with
Count I: Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft
by Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408, and; Count IV: Habitual
Criminal, U.C.A., section 76-8-1001.
Based upon an anonymous tip regarding the operation of a "chop
shop," conveyed to Salt Lake County Sheriff Pete Hayward, Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Detective Gay lord Dent and four other members of the
Automobile Theft Squad went to Wills Auto Repair in Oakley, Utah on
February 16, 1989.

Upon arrival on the scene the officers observed

several vehicles on the premises outside the building.

Of the

several vehicles observed, one, a 1972 GMC, matched the description
of a vehicle recently stolen in Salt Lake City from a Larry Anderson.
Detective Dent went to the vehicle, obtained a vehicle

identification

number, and confirmed that the vehicle had been stolen from Larry
Anderson in Salt Lake City.

The officers found no individuals on the
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premises at this time and left stolen vehicle on the premises. The
officers then procE?eded to the residence of Art Wilkinson in Samak,
Utah where they observed a Yamaha snowmobile which had also been
reported stolen from Larry Anderson in Salt Lake City.

The officers

found no one at the? Wilkinson residence or on the premises and

left

the snowmobile on the premises and returned to Salt Lake County.
Both the 1972 GMC and the Yamaha snowmobile belonged to Larry
Anderson and had been reported by him as stolen on or about February
16, 1989 from the parking lot of a Fred Meyer store in Salt Lake
City.
Detective Dent then proceeded to conduct a "stake-out" of the
premises known as Wills Auto Repair in Oakley, Utah.

The "stake-out"

was conducted on February 16, 20, 2 1 , 2 2 , 23, 2 4 , 25, 26, and 2 7 ,
1989.

On these occasions Detective Dent conducted surveillance of

the premises at various times, however, mostly at night. During the
surveillance, Detective Dent noticed numerous individuals leave and
enter the building freely.

Detective Dent observed that the stolen

1972 GMC vehicle had been moved into the middle bay of the garage but
did not see anyone move the vehicle. On two occasions during the
surveillance

(February 16 and February 23) Detective Dent was

accompanied by Detective Harold Steffee.

During the surveillance the

officers observed the following:
A.

Many individuals enter and leave the premises freely at all

times of the night;
B.

Many individuals driving vehicles up to the premises,

however, the officers never ran checks on the vehicles nor
plates they observed;
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license

C.

Defendant was observed on the premises only once during the

surveillance on February 23, 1989 and that was merely by an open
garage bay door while several other individuals were also on the
premises;
D.

The officers never saw anyone operating any of the vehicles

nor working on any of the vehicles;
E-

On or about February 28, 1989 when Detective Dent conducted

his surveillance he observed the stolen snowmobile

(previously

observed on 2/16/89 at Art Wilkinson's residence in Samak, Utah) on
the premises at Wills Auto, some 25 feet from the building;
F.

During the surveillance Detective Dent never observed

anyone

near the snowmobile;
G-

On or

about February 25, 1989 when Detective Dent conducted

his surveillance he observed a U-Haul transport trailer

(later

determined to be stolen) on the premises at Wills Auto, some 25 feet
from the building;
H.

During the surveillance Detective Dent never observed anyone

near the U-Haul trailer;
On February 2 8 , 1989 Detective Dent and members of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office, in conjunction with members of the Summit
County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant on the premises in
Oakley, Utah (Wills Auto). The warrant was executed at about 9 A.M.
in the morning, the officers were readily able to enter the building
and, upon entry found the Defendant and his wife in the building.
Based upon these events, Defendant was charged under the four
count information. (R91 pg- 19, 1.1 to pg. 9 4 , 1.3)
Defendant, pursuant to a bench trial before the Honorable
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Timothy R. Hanson, was convicted on all four counts and it is from
these convictions that Defendant now appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1-

The Court erred

by convicting and sentencing the Defendant

under two separate counts of Theft by Receiving

(Count I: as to the

1972 GMC and Count II: as to the snowmobile) when the items of
property which were the res of the thefts were stolen in a single
criminal episode from the same individual.
2.

The Court erred by convicting and sentencing the Defendant

under Count I: Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II:
Theft by Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408; and Count III: Theft by
Receiving, U.C.A., section 76-6-408 where none of the Counts properly
delineated a crime, to wit: either Theft by Receiving or Theft by
Concealing, but merely recited the statutory

language of U.C.A.,

section 76-6-408.
3.

The Court erred by convicting Defendant under Count I: Theft

by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408; Count II: Theft by Receiving,
U.C.A., section 76-6-408; Count III: Theft by Receiving, U.C.A.,
section 76-6-408 based upon insufficient evidence, to wit: State
proved no more than Defendant's mere proximity to stolen property or
Defendant's presence near property or

premises and failed to prove

Defendant's dominion and control over property or premises.
4.

The Court erred by convicting the Defendant under Count IV

(Habitual Criminal) when one of the previous underlying felonies was
committed prior to the enactment of the Habitual Criminal

Statute

(U.C.A. 76-8-1001) and thus makes such an application of the Statute
an ex post facto law.
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ARGUMENTS

POINT I
DID THE COURT ERR BY CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT UNDER TWO
SEPARATE COUNTS OF THEFT BY RECEIVING (COUNT I: AS TO THE
1972 GMC AND COUNT II: AS TO THE SNOWMOBILE) WHEN BOTH ITEMS
WERE STOLEN IN A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE FROM THE SAME
INDIVIDUALCount I of the Information under which Defendant was charged,
which was amended at trial

(R92 pg. 3-5, 1. 21) charged the Defendant

with Theft by Receiving, U-C-A, section 76-6-408, to wit: an operable
motor vehicle of Larry Andersen or, in the alternative, property
exceeding one thousand dollars in value. Count I I of the Information
under which Defendant was charged, charged the Defendant with Theft
by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408, to wit: property belonging to
Larry Anderson valued at more than $250.00 but less than $1,000.00.
It was clear from the trial testimony of Larry Anderson that
both the property which formed the basis of Count I (the 1972 GMC
Truck) and the property which formed the basis of Count II (the
snowmobile) were taken at the same time during one criminal episode.
(R91 pg. 121, 1. 11-25)

Due to the lack of evidence presented by the

State during the trial, the State cannot separate the items stolen at
the same time in one criminal episode and make each separate item the
basis of separate criminal counts. (State v. Casias, 106 Utah Adv.
Rep. 52; 1989)
The only permissible way that the State could have separated the
items taken at the same time during one criminal episode and made
each item the basis on a separate criminal count would be if the
State proved at trial that the stolen items were not received by the
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Defendant on one occasion. This principle was set forth in the case
of State v. Bair, 671 P2d 203 (Utah, 1983) wherein the Court stated
at page 206:
"If the evidence does not satisfy this condition, but instead
shows that the stolen articles were all received on one occasion,
then the converse of the foregoing rule is true, i.e., the receipt is
considered a single offense and must be prosecuted as one crime....If
the Defendant's receipt of the various stolen guns occurred on only
one occasion, it definitely satisfied the 'closely related in time'
requirement of the single criminal episode statute, as well as the
'single criminal objective' requirements thereof...." (citing: State
v. Bell, 560 P2d 951 [N.M., 1977] and State v. Kuhnley, 242 P2d 843
CAz., 19523)
The Court in the BAIR case continued at page 207 (citing the
case of State v. Clark, 497 P2d 1210 I0r.,

1972]) by stating:

"If the State contended the articles were received or concealed
by the Defendant on separate occasions, it was incumbent upon it to
offer evidence to that effect."
In the case presently before the State failed to prove or offer
any evidence that the articles in question were received by the
Defendant on separate occasions.
It should also be noted that the information under which
Defendant was charged and convicted alleges that each "receiving of
stolen goods," delineated in Count I, Count II, and Count III
occurred on the same day, to wit: February 2 8 , 1989.
As such, the burden of proof for the State, as discussed above,
becomes even more important and, as indicated by the trial record,
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more conspicuous in its absence.
Therefore, the Court erred in permitting Defendant to be charged
and convicted under Counts I and II.
As to Count III of the Information: Count III of the Information
under which Defendant was charged and convicted, charged the
Defendant with Theft by Receiving, U.C.A, section 76-6-408, to wit:
property belonging to U-Haul exceeding $1,000.00 in value. For the
reasons stated above Count III must likewise be stricken.

Once

again, as the Court stated in the BAIR case:
•'Both the Plaintiff s argument and the trial court s ruling on
the issue are based upon a false premise. They assume that the same
evidence which shows that the various articles of stolen property
were actually

'taken' on three separate occasions also serves as

evidence that Defendant

received

these stolen articles on the same

three occasions. This assumption is entirely misplaced. That proof of
the date of the actual
date of

receipt

taking

does not necessarily establish the

for purposes of the charge of receiving stolen

property has been determined in previous cases."
Once again, the record is void of any evidence presented at
trial which would establish not only that the Defendant received the
property but which would establish that the Defendant received the
property on more than one occasion.
POINT II
DID THE COURT ERR BY CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT OF THEFT BY
RECEIVING, PURSUANT TO COUNTS I, II, AND III, WHERE EACH OF
THESE COUNTS IN THE INFORMATION FAILS TO DELINEATE WHETHER THE
DEFENDANT WAS BEING CHARGED WITH THEFT BY RECEIVING OR THEFT BY
CONCEALING.
The wording of Counts I, II, and III of the information are

-S_

essentially

identical charging that the Defendant

"received,

retained, disposed of, concealed, sold, or withheld..." the property
of another.
The Defendant contends that the way Counts I, II, and III of the
Information were worded, neither Count I, Count II, nor Count III
charges the Defendant with an actionable crime.

Defendant bases this

argument on the case of State v. Ramon, 736 P2d 1059 (Utah App. 1987)
wherein this very Appellate Court ruled that the crime of receiving
stolen property is a separate and distinct crime from concealing
stolen property. (See also: State v. Murphy, 617 P2d 339 [Utah,
1980]; State v. Lamm, 606 P2d 229 [Utah, 1980]; State v. Pappas, 705
P2d 1169 [Utah, 1985])
Since the wording of Counts I, II, and III of the Information do
not adhere to the distinction made in the RAMON case and in
conjunction with the wording found in Rule 9 of the Utah rules of
Criminal Procedure (U.C.A. 77-35-9),

the Information must be stricken

as insufficient to charge a crime and the convictions rendered
pursuant to Counts I, II, and III must be reversed.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED BY CONVICTING DEFENDANT UNDER COUNT I:
THEFT BY RECEIVING, U.C.A, SECTION 76-6-408; COUNT II:
THEFT BY RECEIVING, U.C.A., SECTION 76-6-408; COUNT III:
THEFT BY RECEIVING, U.C.A., SECTION 76-6-408 BASED UPON
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Defendant now argues that his convictions, pursuant to Counts I,
II, and III were based upon insufficient evidence.
A.

As argued above under Point I, the record is void of any

evidence presented by the State at trial which would establish that
the Defendant received and/or concealed the property.
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The evidence adduced at trial showed only that:
— T h e building known as Will's Auto had a "For Rent'1 sign in its
window (R91 pg. 4 2 , 1. 9-17)
— T h e building did not belong to the Defendant (R 91 PQ• 36, 1.
12-23; pg. 152, 1.5-24)
—Many

individuals were seen entering and exiting the building

known as Will's Auto without use of a key or the doors being locked
(R 91pg-52 5 1.8 to pg. 53, 1.7; pg. 54, 1.4-17; pg. 55, 1.4-24; pg.
56, 1.11-23; pg. 103, 1.9-14)
— D e f e n d a n t was never seen in possession of the snowmobile; the
snowmobile remained some 25-30 feet from the building Defendant was
seen entering and exiting

(R 91 pg. 6 8 , 1.20-25; pg. 69, 1.3-5; pg.

83, 1.19-22)
— T h e snowmobile was originally seen parked outside a house
belonging to another individual

(R91 pg.46, 1. 10 to pg. 4 7 , 1.2)

— T h e U-Haul items were brought to the parking lot of Will's
Auto by another individual and remained

lying on the ground some

25-30 feet from the building Defendant was seen exiting and entering
(R91 pg. 6 8 , 1.12-23; pg. 69, 1.3-5)
It was incumbent upon the State to prove at trial that the
Defendant has either actual or constructive possession of the stolen
items.

At least as to the snowmobile and the U-Haul equipment, the

record is void of any evidence that Defendant was in actual or
constructive possession of the stolen items.

At best, the record

merely shows that these items were located in a parking lot near the
road some 20-30 feet from the building in which Defendant was seen.
"Mere proximity to stolen merchandise is not enough to establish
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dominion or control over it. In addition, mere presence is
insufficient to establish dominion and control over the premises
where stolen property is found. (State v. Summers, 728 P2d 613 [Wash.
App., 1986]; State v. Wilson, 544 So.2d 1300 [La.App. 4 Cir., 1989])
All the State showed at trial is that Defendant was in the
proximity and/or presence of the stolen property and this standing by
itself is not sufficient evidence upon which to base a conviction.
B.

As argued above under Point I, the record is void of any

evidence presented by the State at trial which would establish that
the Defendant received and/or concealed the property on more than one
occasion.
C.

One cannot be convicted of theft by receiving when the

actual physical possession of the stolen property had been recovered
by law enforcement officers before delivery of the property to the
accused. (State v. Sterling, 640 P2d 1264 [Kan., 1982])
Defendant asserts that when Detective Dent and the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Auto Theft Squad went up to Oakley, Utah on February
16, 1989 and located the stolen 1972 GMC and the Snowmobile, they
effectively took possession of the items and from that point in time
forward were the individuals who had possession of the stolen
and who were depriving the owner of their possession. (R91

items

pg. 43,

1.8 to pg. 4 7 , 1. 22)
The officers allowed the stolen vehicles to remain on the
premises at Will's Auto for some twelve (12) days before a search
warrant was executed.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERR BY CONVICTING THE DEFENDANT UNDER COUNT
IV (HABITUAL CRIMINAL) WHEN ONE OF THE PREVIOUS UNDERLYING
FELONIES WAS COMMITTED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE HABITUAL
CRIMINAL STATUTE (U.C.A. 76-8-1001)
The statute upon which Count IV of the Information is based,
U.C.A., section 76-8-1001, was passed by the legislature on March 12,
1975 and had an effective date of May 13, 1975.

One of the crimes

upon which the Court relied in finding the Defendant guilty under
Count IV (Habitual Criminal) was a felony which was committed

before

the effective date of the Habitual Criminal statute but for which
Defendant was sentenced after the enactment date of the statute.
Defendant argues that under this set of facts the Habitual Criminal
statute, as applied to the Defendant in this case, acts as an ex post
facto law in that it proscribes a punishment for crime the defendant
committed prior to the enactment of the statute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing arguments, Defendant/Appellant requests that
this Court:
1.

Find that Defendant's convictions under all four (4) counts

of the information be reversed.
2.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

appropriate under the circumstances.
Dated this 29th day of November, 1989.

ELLIOTT LEVINE, Attorne
for
Defendapt/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

THE UNDERSIGNED certifies that they mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this 29th day
of November, 1989, to:

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF UTAH
236 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
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ADDENDUM

A,

That belonged to Mr, Dumas, as I indicated,

the jacket was bearing the name Dumas. Other than that,
they weren't more specifically idendified as belonging to
him,
MR. LEVINE:

Okay.

further questions, Your Honor.

I don't think I have any
I'd ask — well, the

admission of Defendant's Exhibit 15 into evidence.
MR. REED: No objection.
THE COURT: Fifteen is received.

Any redirect

of this witness?
MR. REED: None, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, deputy, you may step
down.
MR. REED: May this witness be excused?
MR. LEVINE: No objection.
THE COURT: You're excused as well.
MR. REED:

State will call Larry Andersen, Your

Honor,
THE COURT: Call Larry Andersen, please.

If

you'll come forward and be sworn, please, sir.
LARRY ANDERSEN
Called as witness in behalf of the plaintiff was
sworn and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Reed: .

Page
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

Q.

1
2

Will you state your full name and spell your

last name, please?

3

A.

Larry Andersen.

4

Q.

How is your last name spelled?

5

A.

An E-N.

6

Q.

Are you a resident of Salt Lake County?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Were you residing in Salt Lake County in

9

February of 1989?

10

A,

Yes.

11

Q.

At any time in February 1989, did you have

12

property stolen?

13

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

14

Q.

And did you report that property stolen?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

When did that occur?

17

A.

I think it was on the 4th of February.

18

Q.

What property was it that was taken at that

20

A.

A truck, 1972 GMC, and a snowmobile.

21

Q.

Were those items taken at the same time?

22

A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

23

Q.

From what location were they taken?

24

A.

It was a parking lot in Fred Meyers in Salt

19

time?

Lake.

Page 121
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

vehicle insi de the garage, and observations of the
3k i. -Dou oa tne Monday ~:gnL, which wouic nave oeen the
2 7th.
Q,
w

i i i i iMiJiii1!

A.

And that would have been o/e: a"

v

.

I.II i < : M ; P .

No, sir.

The Ski-Doo was In front ni

\::e

shop on the 27th.
Q.
27th,

Okd ,

you never

I,, l

, ,|. I I,

saw t h e

|. I M I li.i,!

Up t il 1 the

Ski-Doo uii Llie p r o p e r t y ;

is

that

correct?

i i, in,

A.

I don' 1. [ ei d I I h»n i nrj

Q.

And *•

w

,,

A.

what p o i n t

| , |M | | | •, i i i Jin
That

l„ P 1 i , p

Q.

•

time

— o\

i ,

And you j u s t

> i i

II

jnce a g a i n

the

stuff?

N

nn t h e S a t u r d a y ,
•

n I I J HUM I I

you not i r e d t h e 11-Haul

1 recall

(1-Hau i was s e e n i n e i P

in

pen

the 25th, E

•

noticed

il

thei e t h e n ,

io

that

correct?
A.; .

• iv-i

Q.

' And once again, that was outside some

twenty-live c: -hirty feet from the building?
• A.
Q.

Twenty

I

Twenty
• .v- -

A.

Lhii 1. y 1 fi'l
*hirty tee: frorr; * he building.
L U chircy ieet irom t-ne Dui_a.*ng?

Yes, sir.
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1|

Q. •

C : /ou notice any tracks around there?

2I

A.

Other than ::acK ^ar<s

3

Q.

v .

4

—

-.

.

:.*als go near those

items at ail?

5

A.

Not when

Q.

Let

* v-i- --^-«»

i

6

drawing again,

7

an*: maybe mark where these items *e, ^ - n

8

building.

9

'A.

0

Q.

?lat-:n

- the

kjy .
Ski-Doo, and

maybe just put an S. and a

c i r c l e f o r r ne \Ik i Onm.
h.

Okay

I'lie f r o n t t r a i l e r ,

v e h i c l e was no l o n g e r
Q.

0 h HI v

A.

riidi

fd"ilii

i in

photograph
' "''

i)ii'. e

if

¥h*Lir

i'."id i II

|J

!

i '"'

•'"

|

i

| |

"

1!: was e i t h e r h e r e or h e r e ,

i t was i n f r o n t

1 eon hi ml in'in is. h,

or b a c k .

I

With t h e

111 e n t i, 1 ;, M .

And t h e Road Runner,, was t h e Road Runner

p a r k e d i n t h e same p l a c e ,
A-

' "

here.

J,1 ' \ e r 3

"

don't; r e c a l l

somewhat

11< i HIM ! Lie i i eve was heir- amj I licit Road

I nil I i

1

this

Time t r a i l e r was p a r k e d

not q u l ^ e t h a t f a r o u t ,

Runner was p a r k e d
11

time

there.

had been movnl

in t h a t f a s h i o n ,

at that

'!! I

or d i d Miar v e h i c l e

keep

N" J ,l 'Runner r e m a i n e d h e r e when it: uavi
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been taken off of the trailer.
Q.

Did you ever see it on the trailer?

A,

Yes.

Q.

On the 25th you saw it on the trailer?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you run a license plate check on there?

A.

There wasn't a license plate on the vehicle.

Q.

So you saw it sitting out front on the

On the 25th.

trailer?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And then after that you just saw it parked

permanently in front there?
A.

Uh huh (affirmative).

Q.

Did you do any check on that to determine if

that vehicle was stolen?
A.

There was no way to check.

There was no

license plate, and I obviously couldn't approach the
building.
Q.

So you don't know if that was legitimately

there or stolen?
A.

At that time I did not.

Q.

When did you first find out about this

warrant being issued?
A.

I'm sorry, which warrant?

Q.

The warrant that was executed on the 28th?
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